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Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage:
A Response to Calhoun

SAMUEL C. RICKLESS*

Cheshire Calhoun’s paper falls into three parts.1 In the first, she
argues that paying “more careful attention to the historical practice of
polygamy strengthens [rather than, as is often thought, weakens] the case
for same-sex marriage.”2 In the second, she argues that “the state would
do better to move toward [and advocates of same-sex marriage would do
better to advocate] a more pluralistic conception of personal
relationships.”3 She freely admits that such a pluralistic conception
makes room for the legal recognition of polygamous marriages.4 But in
the third section she argues that there is nothing inherently wrong with
polygamy: in particular, as she puts it, “gender inequality is a
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy.”5 The conclusion to
be drawn from her discussion is that advocates of same-sex marriage
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1. Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for
Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1023 (2005).
2. Id. at 1037.
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. See id. (recognizing that “[d]isestablishing a single state form of marriage
would, of course, open the doors to state recognition of polygamous marriages”).
5. Id. at 1039.
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should happily bite Scalia’s bullet:6 if we legalize same-sex marriage,
then (by the same token) we should legalize polygamy.
In this Comment, I would like to raise some objections to each of the
three main sections of Calhoun’s paper. I do not think of these
objections as fatal to Calhoun’s project, but I do think that they represent
difficulties that need to be addressed if I am to be brought to agree with
her main claims.
Let us begin with Calhoun’s claim that attention to the historical
practice of polygamy strengthens, rather than weakens, the case for
same-sex marriage.7 As Calhoun points out, opponents of legalization
often argue, on traditionalist grounds, (1) that legalization should follow
core social values, (2) that core social values are determined by the
Judeo-Christian tradition, and (3) that this tradition is overwhelmingly
hostile to recognition of same-sex marriage.8 Although Calhoun recognizes
that it is possible to challenge this argument by denying that legalization
should follow core social values (or, for that matter, that these values are
determined by religious tradition),9 she claims that the Judeo-Christian
tradition is not nearly as hostile to same-sex marriage as traditionalists
believe.10 Calhoun bases this claim on the following evidence: the Old
Testament patriarchs engaged in polygamy; the Bible never speaks
against polygamy; some European Jews practiced polygamy until the
eleventh century, and only banned it under duress; Martin Luther argued
that Christianity does not proscribe polygamy; and The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints recognized (and, in fact, encouraged)
polygamous marriage until 1890, and only banned it under duress.11
Accordingly, Calhoun concludes that “polygamous marriage cannot be
dismissed as a negligible blip in an otherwise consistent tradition of
heterosexual monogamous marriage.”12
In response to this, it might be argued (reasonably, it seems to me)
that, even if the practice of polygamy is not a “negligible blip,” it has
certainly not achieved (and would not have achieved, even in the
absence of governmental pressure) the status of anything approaching
6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“If . . . the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state
interest, [criminal laws against bigamy cannot] survive rational-basis review.”).
7. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1037.
8. Id. at 1027–30.
9. See id. at 1027 (pointing out that “[o]ne way of challenging the traditionalist’s
argument is to challenge the propriety of premising our laws on the majority’s moral or
religious values . . . .”).
10. See id. at 1028 (noting “there has been at least a minor thread within the
Judeo-Christian tradition of acknowledging same-sex unions”).
11. Id. at 1028–29.
12. Id. at 1029.
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monogamy in cultural significance. For one thing, the mainline
Christian and Jewish denominations have been uniformly hostile to
polygamy for centuries. For another, polygamous sects (such as the
Mormons) are clearly offshoots (and would have remained so even in
the absence of governmental interference). Every religious denomination
has its offshoots and dissenters. What the traditionalist will say, I think,
is that core social values are determined by the overwhelming majority,
rather than a very small minority.
In support of her second claim, which is that the state and proponents
of same-sex marriage would do better to support a pluralistic conception
of marriage,13 Calhoun says this: there are two ways to look at civil
marriage. On the one hand, one can think of civil marriage as a private
contract entered into only by voluntary consent.14 On the other, one can
think of civil marriage as a public status, like citizenship, the nature of
which is appropriately determined by the state according to its
conception of what conduces to the general welfare.15 Calhoun argues
that these two conceptions of civil marriage “pull against each other”:16
the principle that persons should be free to enter into binding contracts
as long as this does not violate the rights of others pushes in the
direction of hymeneal pluralism;17 but the principle that only civil
marriages that conduce to the public good should be recognized pushes
in the direction of hymeneal monism.18 Calhoun then argues that, of
these two principles, the state should adopt the first (pluralistic)
principle, rather than the second (monistic) principle.19 For, as she puts
it, “maintaining a single state definition of marriage is at odds with the
fundamental premises of a liberal political society, with the private,
contractual aspect of marriage, and with satisfying individuals’ multiple
relational needs.”20
In response, I want to take issue with the dichotomy that forms the
basis of Calhoun’s argument for hymeneal pluralism. Even within a
liberal political society, there is nothing sacrosanct about private
contracts per se. Bars to contract enforcement include the risk of danger
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1034.
Id. at 1037.
Id.
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to oneself or others as a result of ignorance or irrationality. Some
contracts are simply void ab initio. The liberal state’s role is not merely
to enforce, but also to regulate private contracts in order to protect the
contracting parties against their own ignorance and irrationality. (For
example, it would be well within the purview of the liberal state to
declare contracts into slavery or indentured servitude null and void.) Of
course, this is not to say that liberal paternalism knows no bounds: there
are limits to what a liberal state may do in the name of protecting the
parties to private contracts. But it remains true that the regulative model
of the state vis-à-vis private contracts differs from, and offers us
something of a middle way between, both of the models Calhoun offers:
on the one hand, perfect freedom of contract, and on the other, state
definition of marriage for the public good.
I would argue further that the regulative model makes it possible to
explain, in a principled way consistent with good old-fashioned liberalism,
how one might coherently support the legalization of same-sex marriage
without thereby being committed to supporting the legalization of
polygamy. The relevant issue is whether there are sufficiently weighty
paternalistic reasons to ban polygamy (or certain forms of polygamy),
without there being sufficiently weighty paternalistic reasons to ban
same-sex marriage. Arguably, there are. At least as currently practiced in
the United States, polygamy takes the form of polygyny (one husband,
many wives) rather than polyandry (one wife, many husbands).21 The
most common polygynous relationships, at their inception, involve a
much older husband and a very young wife (usually still in her teens).22
At least within the offshoots of Mormonism that look kindly on
polygyny, the wife-to-be has been raised to believe that it is her religious
duty to enter such a marriage and then bear as many children as
possible.23 These circumstances suggest that polygamy survives only on
21. See D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY, AND
EDUCATION 240 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993) (“[Mormon
fundamentalists believe] that God sanctions and commands that righteous men of a
divine latter-day Covenant marry more than one wife.”).
22. Id. at 259 (“But plural wives are often teenagers and sometimes twenty years
younger than their polygamous husbands.”). As this Comment goes to press, the New
York Times reports that the head of the polygynous Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, Warren Jeffs, who is reported to have 60 or 70 wives, “is a fugitive,
indicted [in June 2005] on sexual abuse charges that he forced a 16-year-old girl to
marry a 28-year-old married man. Opponents of Mr. Jeffs say he ordered hundreds of
such unions, often between girls barely in their teens and men decades older.” Nick
Madigan, After Fleeing Polygamist Community, an Opportunity for Influence, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A1.
23. According to Mormon theology, the spirit-children of gods wait to be born as
humans. Since a spirit-child cannot become a god without his faith’s having been tested
as a human being, unborn spirit-children cannot reach the state of divine exaltation.
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the backs of young girls who have been brainwashed into submitting to a
practice to which they would not otherwise freely consent. Even if
Calhoun were right that the state has no business regulating polygamous
marriages freely entered into by knowledgeable and rational adults, the
practical consequences of banning the particular kinds of polygyny just
discussed would be no different from the practical consequences of
banning polygamy altogether.
Still, as Calhoun might argue, the regulative model by itself does not
speak against polygamous marriages generally, but only against
particular kinds of polygamous marriages (polygynous marriages in
which the wives-to-be are cognitively or emotionally immature). This
brings us to Calhoun’s third point, which is that there is nothing
inherently wrong with polygamy: if polygamy conduces to gender
inequality, it does so only contingently.24 At least in principle, it might
be possible for some polygamous marriages to survive the state’s
paternalistic interest in protecting the contracting parties.
In reply, I want to suggest that there are reasons to believe that
polygamy is essentially problematic and unstable. A marriage is a
committed relationship designed to facilitate the rearing of children and
the fulfillment of deep emotional needs, including most notably sexual
and other personal forms of intimacy. Suppose now that we have a
polyandrous marriage in which Carol is married to both Bob and Ted.
Even if Bob and Ted enter such a marriage with their eyes open, reason
and experience suggest that neither husband should have any confidence
that his relationship with Carol will be able to survive Carol’s
relationship with another husband. Imagine the possibilities. Suppose
Bob and Carol are childless, while Ted and Carol have four children. Or
suppose Bob stays fit while Ted, whether culpably or nonculpably,
contracts a serious illness. Or suppose Bob has a well-paying job, but
Ted is unemployed. Even if Carol is scrupulously fair, it stands to
reason that Ted’s problems or responsibilities under these sorts of
circumstances will place enormous emotional pressure on Bob. If Ted is
caring for four children, or Ted is seriously ill, or Ted is depressed
Thus, the more children a human woman begets, the more spirit-children are given the
chance of achieving exaltation. See JAMES H. SNOWDEN, THE TRUTH ABOUT MORMONISM
141 (1926) (“[The glory of Mormon men] is in proportion to the number of their wives
and children.”).
24. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1039 (stating that “gender inequality is a
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy”).
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because he cannot find a job, then Carol will naturally feel the need to
spend more time with Ted and correspondingly less time with Bob.
Under these circumstances, it is natural for Bob to feel shortchanged,
especially if he thinks that Ted is in any way responsible for the relevant
circumstances. Even under ideal circumstances, each husband’s need
for emotional intimacy conduces to competition for Carol’s attention.
The fact is that all marriages face crises and that many monogamous
partners fail to manage these crises effectively. By reason of their very
structure, polygamous marriages are even less likely to withstand such
pressure over the long term.25 One result of this is that the children of
such marriages are likely to suffer because their emotional needs are not
fulfilled, whether or not the marriage survives.
Now it seems to me that, on the regulative model, the state, exercising
legitimate paternalistic powers, ought to be able to ban marriages that
are structurally problematic in this way. Notice that same-sex
marriage per se does not suffer from this kind of structural infirmity.
Nor, for that matter, do marriages that take the form of ménages-a-trois, or
ménages-a-quatre, and so on—marriages in which (in some sense) each
of the spouses is “married” to each of the other spouses. Structural
problems arise only in the context of the sort of asymmetrical
relationship definitive of polygamous marriage.
Ultimately, then, I do not believe that Calhoun has provided sufficiently
compelling reasons to bite Scalia’s bullet.26 And given the rest of the
bullets in Scalia’s arsenal of slippery slope arguments, this may be a
good thing, too.

25. See D. Michael Quinn, supra note 21, at 261. D. Michael Quinn also reports
that “jealousy can be corrosive even for the most devoted fundamentalist families.” Id.
26. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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